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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.

:

Case No. 900484-CA

t

GERARD COTERO J. LOPEZ,
Defendant-Appellee.

:
:

Category No. 2

BRIEF OF APPELLANT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from the trial court's order granting
defendants' motion to suppress evidence.
This Court has jurisdiction to hear the appeal under
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(e) (Supp. 1990).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
AND STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
The following issues are presented on appeal:
1.

Do the trial court's findings of fact meet the

requirement of detailed findings of fact set forth in State v.
Lovearen, 798 P.2d 767, 770-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1990)?
Because this presents a question of law, a "correction
of error" standard of review applies.

City of Monticello v.

Christensen. 788 P.2d 513, 516 (Utah), cert, denied, 111 S. Ct.
120 (1990); Provo City Corporation v. Willden. 768 P.2d 455, 456
(Utah 1989).
2.

Is the trial court's finding that "[t]here was no
1

testimony that Mr. Lopez had ever represented himself to Officer
Hamner as being named or going by the name of Jose Cruz," clearly
erroneous?
The factual findings underlying a trial court's ruling
on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed on appeal unless
they are clearly erroneous.

State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258

(Utah 1987).
3.

Did the trial court apply the pertinent legal

standard in concluding that the stop of defendant was pretextual?
In assessing the trial court's legal conclusions based
on its factual findings, the appellate court applies a
"correction of error" standard of review.

State v. Palmer, 803

P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
4.

Should this Court retain the pretext stop analysis

adopted in State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972, 977-79 (Utah Ct. App.
1988), disavowed on other grounds, State v. Arroyo, 796 P.2d 684
(Utah 1990)?
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Any relevant text of constitutional, statutory, or rule
provisions pertinent to the resolution of the issues presented on
appeal is contained in the body of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Gerard Cotero J. Lopez, was charged with
unlawful possession of a controlled substance (cocaine) with
intent to distribute, a second degree felony, under Utah Code
Ann. § 58-37-8(l)(a)(iv) (1990) (R. 6-7).
2

Defendant filed a motion to suppress the cocaine found
by a police officer in defendant's car (R. 19-20).

After a

suppression hearing, the trial court granted defendant's motion
(R. 27-31).

The State filed a petition for permission to appeal

pursuant to rule 5, Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, and Utah
Code Ann. § 77-18a-l(2)(e) (Supp. 1990) (R. 34-53).

This Court

granted the petition (R. 67).
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The sole witness at the suppression hearing was Officer
Hamner, an officer with the Salt Lake City Police Department (SH.
6).

He testified to the following pertinent facts.
On June 6, 1990, Officer Hamner saw defendant traveling

southbound on 400 East in Salt Lake City in a vehicle the officer
recognized as one he had seen on a number of occasions in the
vicinity of two local bars which were known for criminal activity
ranging from robberies to illegal drug use.

Hamner recognized

defendant from the officer's days as an undercover officer
approximately nine months earlier.

Others had pointed out

defendant out as a drug dealer and had identified him as Jose
Cruz to Hamner.

Defendant had introduced himself as Jose Cruz to

Hamner, and Hamner believed that that was his name. Furthermore,
Hamner knew of "Jose Cruz" through his work with the Metro
Narcotics Strike Force, having been shown a picture of Cruz (SH.
6-9, 18, 20, 23-24).
Upon seeing defendant, Hamner, believing that
defendant's name was Jose Cruz, followed defendant and

3

immediately checked whether he had a driver's license.

Hamner

made this check because when he knew defendant nine months
earlier, defendant did not have a license.

Having determined

that there was no record of a driver's license for a Jose Cruz,
Hamner observed defendant make a turn without signaling.

Hamner

then pulled over defendant and asked him for a driver's license.
Defendant was unable to produce a license but did produce an
identification card that indicated he was "Geraldo Lopez."
Hamner ran a warrants check on Geraldo Lopez, discovered that
there were three outstanding warrants on him, and placed
defendant under arrest.

Defendant was subsequently cited for

driving without a driver's license and the failure to signal
before making a turn1.

Hamner impounded defendant's vehicle,

and during an inventory search of it, he and another officer
found several bags of a white powder which field-tested positive
for cocaine (SH. 10, 12-15).

Hamner testified that, although he

suspected defendant of having something to do with drugs, he
stopped defendant for driving without a license and the illegal
turn (SH. 20-21).
In considering defendant's motion to suppress, the
trial court found the following facts:
1. Mr. Lopez was pointed out to Officer
Hamner by someone else on a previous occasion
and that he was pointed out as Jose Cruz, a
dealer in drugs;

1

Officer Hamner testified that he writes citations for
failure to signal about seven times a month, and that he always
stops an individual suspected of driving without a driver's
license unless he is "en route to a very high pariority call" (SH.
11).
-4-

2. Officer Hamner relied on erroneous
information and stopped who he thought was
Jose Cruz in order to search for drugs.
3. Based on the wrong name Officer Hamner
also did a Driver's License check and found
there was no license issued to Jose Cruz;
4. There was no testimony that Mr. Lopez had
ever represented himself to Officer Hamner as
being named or going by the name of Jose
Cruz, nor had he ever stopped defendant
before;
5. At about the same time Officer Hamner
observed defendant make a left turn and says
he did not see a signal at which time a stop
was made;
6. The (underlying motivation for the stop
was to search for drugsTJand all conclusions
as to the identity of TIr. Lopez as Jose Cruz
were erroneous.
(R. 27-28).
Based on the foregoing findings of fact, the court
suppressed the evidence, stating the following conclusions of
law:
/ l . The underlying motivation to follow and
S^to stop the [sic] search for drugs;
2. The stop was a "pretext stop" the [sic]
subsequent search of the car and seizure of
the contraband also violated Mr. Lopez's
state and federal constitutional rights
against unreasonable searches and seizures.

7

3. The contraband seized from the car may
not be presented in evidence against Mr.
Lopez, and his motion to suppress this
evidence is hereby granted.
(R. 28-29).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
In suppressing the evidence seized from the car
defendant was driving, the trial court adopted findings of fact

-5-

drafted by defendant's counsel.

Those findings are very brief

and do not set out the circumstances of Officer Hamner's contact
with defendant prior to the investigatory stop at issue here, or
the totality of the
car.

circumstances of the stop of defendant's

Without specific findings of fact on those points, this

Court cannot properly review the trial court's legal conclusion
that the stop of defendant was pretextual.

Nor can the parties

be adequately informed of the facts that underpin the lower
court's legal conclusion.

In short, the findings of fact in this

case do not meet the requirements of State v. Lovearen, 798 P.2d
767, 770-71 (Utah Ct. App. 1990).
In light of Officer Hamner's testimony that defendant
had prevously introduced himself to Hamner as Jose Cruz, the
trial court's finding that "[t]here was no testimony that Mr.
Lopez had ever represented himself to Officer Hamner as being
named or going by the name of Jose Cruz," is clearly erroneous.
State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258 (Utah 1987) (the factual
findings underlying the trial court's ruling on a motion to
suppress will not be disturbed unless they are clearly
erroneous).
In arriving at its conclusion that Officer Hamner's
stop of defendant was pretextual, the trial court did not cite
the standard for that determination or indicate how that standard
was met in this case.

See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 972 (Utah

Ct. App. 1988), disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).

Indeed, when the Sierra standard is

applied, the court's finding of pretext appears to be incorrect,
-6-

in that defendant failed to demonstrate that the hypothetical
reasonable officer would not have stopped a driver for failing to
signal before making a turn or for driving without a driver's
license.

See State v. Smith, 781 P.2d 879 (Utah Ct. App. 1989).
Finally, this Court should abandon the pretext stop

analysis adopted in Sierra and simply require an analysis of the
legality of the stop under Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968), and
Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

See, e.g., United

States v. Triaas, 878 F.2d 1037 (7th Cir. 1989).
ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS OF FACT ARE
INADEQUATE UNDER STATE V. LOVEGREN, 798 P.2D
767 (UTAH CT. APP. 1990).
In suppressing the evidence seized from the car
defendant was driving, the trial court adopted findings of fact
drafted by defendant's counsel.

Those findings are very brief

and do not set out the circumstances of Officer Hamner's contact
with defendant prior to the investigatory stop at issue here, or
the totality of the circumstances of the stop of defendant's car.
Nor are there any findings as to usual police practices
concerning the offenses of driving without a driver's license and
failing to signal before turning.

Without specific and detailed

findings of fact on these points, this Court cannot properly
review the trial court's legal conclusion that the stop of
defendant was pretextual.

Nor can the parties be adequately

informed of the facts that underpin the court's legal conclusion.
In short, the trial court's findings of fact are inadequate under
-7-

State v, Loveqren, 798 P.2d 767 (Utah Ct. App. 1990) f which
requires the trial court to prepare detailed findings of fact for
suppression rulings, so that this Court can "meaningfully review
the issues on appeal."

798 P.2d at 770.

"[T]he findings of fact

must reveal how the [trial] court resolved each material issue."
Id. at 771 (quoting Acton v Deliran, 737 P.2d 996, 999 (Utah
1987)).

Accordingly, this case should be remanded for entry of

adequate findings of fact.

Ibid.
POINT II

THE TRIAL COURT'S FINDING THAT THERE WAS NO
TESTIMONY THAT DEFENDANT HAD EVER REPRESENTED
HIMSELF TO OFFICER HAMNER AS BEING JOSE CRUZ
IS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS.
The trial court found that "[t]here was no testimony
that Mr. Lopez had ever represented himself to Officer Hamner as
being or going by the name of Jose Cruz" (R. 28). However, in
light of Officer Hamner's testimony that defendant had previously
introduced himself to Hamner as Jose Cruz (SH. 23), that finding
is clearly erroneous.

See State v. Ashe, 745 P.2d 1255, 1258

(Utah 1987) (the factual findings underlying the trial court's
ruling on a motion to suppress will not be disturbed unless they
are clearly erroneous); State v. Webb, 790 P.2d 65, 82 (Utah Ct.
App. 1990) ("A finding is clearly erroneous if 'it is against the
clear weight of the evidence, or if the appellate court otherwise
reaches a definite and firm conviction that a mistake has been
made.'" (citations omitted)).
Although some confusion on this point may have been

-8-

created in cross-examination of Hamner2, it is clear from the
record that Hamner testified that defendant introduced himself to
the officer as Jose Cruz.

Indeed, the trial court explicity

recognized this in discussing a point in closing argument with
the prosecutor:
[T]he officer testified that he suspected
Mr. Lopez of dealing drugs when he was
undercover, and . . . had been introduced to
Mr. Lopez as Mr. Cruz. . . . The officer
testified Mr. Lopez identified himself as Mr.
Cruz.
(SH. 28-29).

2

The following exchange occurred between defense counsel
and Officer Hamner:
[Defense counsel]: He introduced himself
personally to you? Because you indicated
that somebody pointed him out to you.
[Officer Hamner]: At the Annex Bar when I
was doing my routine patrol a week prior. He
was pointed out.
Q.

He was pointed out?

A.

Yes.

Q.

And they told you that's Jose Cruz?

A. Yes.
[Defense counsel]:
[Officer Hamner]:
from previous.

Okay.
Or I had known his name

[The prosecutor]: I'm not sure if the
witness understood the question, did you?
Prior to that week had you ever personally
met the defendant?
[Officer Hamner]:
Bar.

Yes, I did.

(SH. 24).
-9-

In the Annex

Accordingly, in remanding the case for more detailed
findings, this Court should direct the trial court that its
finding that there was no testimony that defendant had ever
represented himself as Jose Cruz to Hamner, is clearly erroneous,

POINT III
IN CONCLUDING THAT A PRETEXT STOP HAD
OCCURRED, THE TRIAL COURT FAILED TO APPLY THE
PERTINENT LAW.
In arriving at its conclusion that Officer Hamner's
stop of defendant was pretextual, the trial court did not cite
the standard for that determination or indicate how that standard
was met in this case.

See State v. Sierra, 754 P.2d 97 2 (Utah

Ct. App. 1988), disavowed on other grounds. State v. Arroyo, 796
P.2d 684, 689 (Utah 1990).
In Sierra, this Court set forth the following standard
for determining whether a pretext stop has occurred:
[I]f a hypothetical reasonable police officer
would not have stopped the driver for the
cited offense, and the surrounding
circumstances indicate the stop is a pretext,
the stop is unconstitutional.
754 P.2d at 979.

The inquiry focuses on whether the reasonable

officer would have made a stop under the circumstances, not
whether the officer could
test is an objective one.

have made a stop. JId. at 978. The
Sierra, 754 P.2d at 977-78; United

States v. Guzman, 864 F.2d 1512, 1517 (10th Cir. 1988).

The

trial court neither mentioned nor applied this standard in ruling
that the stop was a pretext (R. 27-29).

-10-

In fact, defendant

failed to mention or analyze the Sierra standard in arguing that
a pretext stop had occurred (SH. 29-30).
Therefore, in remanding the case for more detailed
findings, this Court should direct the trial court to apply the
Sierra standard in determining whether a pretext stop occurred.3
Given the undisputed testimony of the officer that he routinely
stops and cites for driving without a license and failing to
signal before making a turn (SH. 11), there appears to be no
basis for concluding that the stop was pretextual.

See State v.

Lovegren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10 (based upon record evidence, stop
for following too closely not pretextual); State v. Smith, 781
P.2d 879, 883 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (stop for failing to signal
before making a turn not pretextual, as "this is the type of
clear cut traffic violation for which officers routinely stop
citizens and issue citations").
POINT IV
THIS COURT SHOULD ABANDON THE PRETEXT STOP
ANALYSIS ADOPTED IN SIERRA AND SIMPLY ANALYZE
THE LEGALITY OF THE STOP UNDER THE
TRADITIONAL DELAWARE V. PROUSE TEST.
The Sierra Court adopted the pretext analysis followed
by the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals in United States v.
Smith, 799 F.2d 706 (11th Cir. 1986).

However, it did so without

discussing a contrary view that has been followed by a number of
other federal circuits and some state courts.

This alternative

view, which represents a more direct and easily applied approach

3

The Court should direct the lower court to apply the
Sierra standard only if it does not adopt the legal principle
argued for by the State in Point IV of this brief.
-11-.

to the question of whether a vehicle stop is constitutional,
should replace the Sierra analysis.
The "hypothetical reasonable officer" standard adopted
in Sierra is difficult to apply.
this Court's decisions.

This is evident from several of

For example, in Sierra itself, the Court

purported to apply a pretext analysis—which "occurs when the
police use a legal justification to make the stop in order to
search a person or place, or to interrogate a person, for an
unrelated serious crime for which they do not have the reasonable
suspicion necessary to support a stop," United States v. Guzman,
864 F.2d at 1515—but actually applied the investigatory stop
test set forth in Delaware v. Prouse, 440 U.S. 648 (1979).

Under

Prouse, to lawfully stop a vehicle for investigatory purposes, an
officer must have a reasonable suspicion or probable cause that
either the vehicle or an occupant has violated or is about to
violate the law (i.e., a traffic or equipment regulation, or any
applicable criminal law). j[d. at 661, 663.

See also State v.

Gibson, 665 P.2d 1302, 1304 (Utah), cert, denied, 464 U.S. 894
(1983); State v. Baird, 763 P.2d 1214, 1216 (Utah Ct. App. 1988).
The Sierra Court's conclusion that a reasonable officer would not
have stopped the defendant's car, 754 P.2d at 979, was based on
it being "unable to assess whether [the defendant] even violated
Utah's left-lane provisions," ibid.

At bottom, in finding the

stop to be pretextual, the Court did not assume the technical
validity of the initial stop under the Prouse standard, as it
would have to under the pretext analysis set forth in United
States v. Smith and Guzman, and then proceed to the question of

-12-

whether the "hypothetical reasonable officer" would have made
this technically lawful stop under the circumstances.

It

actually found an absence of reasonable suspicion to justify the
stop, a violation of Prouse.
An additional problem with Sierra is that although the
Court stated that the pretext standard is an objective standard,
it nevertheless fully considered the officer's subjective mental
state in determining that a pretext stop had occurred.
P.2d at 979-80.

See 754

This same problem of subjective elements finding

their way into a purportedly objective test appears in subsequent
decisions of this Court where pretext and Sierra are discussed.
See, e.g., State v. Marshall, 791 P.2d 880, 883 (Utah Ct. App.),
cert, denied,

P.2d

(Utah 1990); State v. Arroyo, 770

P.2d 153, 155 (Utah Ct. App. 1989), reversed on other grounds,
796 P.2d 684 (Utah 1990).
Finally, it is not clear from this Court's pretext
cases what evidence is necessary to establish what the
"hypothetical reasonable officer" would have done under certain
circumstances and which party must shoulder the burden of proof
on the pretext question.

Compare Arroyo, 770 P.2d at 155 (stop

for "following too closely" pretextual), with State v. Lovegren,
798 P.2d at 771 n.10 (stop for "following too closely" not
pretextual).
Given these problems with the Sierra pretext analysis,
this Court should abandon that standard in favor of the
traditional reasonable suspicion/probable cause standard for
assessing the validity of a particular seizure. As noted

-13-

earlier, a number of federal and state courts have rejected the
Sierra pretext analysis, limiting the inquiry to whether the
police had either reasonable suspicion or probable cause to
justify the seizure (i.e., a stop or an arrest).

See, e.g.,

United States v. Trigg, 925 F.2d 1064 (7th Cir. 1991); United
States v. Cummins, 920 F.2d 498 (8th Cir. 1990) (specifically
rejecting the pretext test adopted in United States v. Smith and
United States v. Guzman): State v. Olaiz, 100 Or.App. 380f 786
P.2d 734 (Or. App.), review denied, 794 P.2d 793 (Or. 1990).

The

inquiry does not go beyond that point to ask whether the officer
normally would have effected the seizure under the circumstances.
Ibid.

"'[S]o long as the the police are doing no more than they

are legally permitted and objectively authorized to do, [the
resulting stop or] arrest is constitutional. 'fl Cummins, 920 F.2d
at 501 (quoting United States v. Trigg, 878 F.2d 1037, 1041 (7th
Cir. 1989) (relying upon United States v. Causey, 834 F.2d 1179,
1184 (5th Cir. 1987) (M[TJhe Court has told us that where police
officers are objectively doing what they are legally authorized
to do . . . the results of their investigations are not to be
called in question on the basis of any subjective intent with
which they acted.")).
This approach is most consistent with the well settled
principle that "the fact that the officer does not have the state
of mind which is hypothecated by the reasons which provide the
legal justification for the officer's action does not invalidate
the action taken as long as the circumstances, viewed
objectively, justify that action."

-14-

Scott v. United States, 436

U.S. 128, 138 (1978).

"The Court's language leaves little doubt

that 'the officer's actual state of mind at the time of the
challenged action was taken[]' is of no significance in
determining whether a violation of the Fourth Amendment has
occurred."

Cummins, 920 F.2d at 501 (quoting Maryland v. Macon.

472 U.S. 463, 470-71 (1985)) (footnote omitted).

Furthermore,

the "usual police practices" approach, which is inherent in the
Sierra pretext analysis, see Loveqren, 798 P.2d at 771 n.10, is a
far reaching check on the discretion of individual police
officers which is not firmly grounded in the Supreme Court's
fourth amendment jurisprudence.

"The Court . . . has never

indicated that the discretionary exercise of the arrest [or
detention] power, a power that is contingent upon a prior
determination of probable cause [or reasonable suspicion], is
constitutionally significant."

Trigg, 878 F.2d at 1041.

In sum, this Court should abandon the Sierra standard
in favor of the approach followed in Trigg and numerous other
courts, and should direct the trial court on remand to consider
only whether the stop of defendant was lawful under Delaware v.
Prouse.
CONCLUSION
Based upon the foregoing arguments, this Court should
reverse the trial court's suppression order and remand the case
for the entry of adequate findings of fact and a ruling only on
whether the vehicle stop was lawful under Delaware v. Prouse.
Alternatively, the Court should direct the trial court
to consider whether the stop of defendant was pretextual under
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the standard set forth in State v. Sierra,
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